

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NA - Mr. Johnson

DATE: 12/5/50

FROM : NA - Mr. Emmons *Mr. Holt*

SUBJECT: Seoul Despatch No. 30, November 15, 1950

This despatch transmits ~~an independent~~ survey of the Korean refugee situation in a specified area of north Korea.

In view of the large mass of refugees in the Sinanju-Anju-Kunuri-Maengsan area, General Walker was at a loss to understand the reason for the movement and requested the Embassy to investigate the unusual flow.

The survey indicates that the majority of refugees had left their homes on the advice of ROK security officers appointed by UN forces or of ROK troops. There is no evidence that the enemy had planned to create the refugee movement. Although Communist infiltrators could readily have mixed in with these refugees, thorough checking by CIC and Korean army personnel revealed very few arms or equipment for sabotage or guerrilla action.

Interestingly enough, a northward flow of returning refugees developed soon afterwards. Numerous refugees interviewed were anxious to return to their homes and inquired as to the advisability of going back. Some refugees, however, are still drifting southward and a few thousand are expected to reach Pyongyang eventually.

The attitude of all refugees encountered was uniformly friendly. Most were eager to supply information even in excess of that asked for.

The reporters recommend:

\*that plans be made to establish training camps for refugee young men, should another such refugee movement be encountered. The men could be trained as local police, to prepare them for return to their home villages, and could also serve as a source of labor on railroads, highways, etc. A program of re-indoctrination could also be begun. In this way, all potential subversives would be in plain sight and under control. Since all screening methods are uncertain, and since after five years of Communist training the sympathies of all North Korean young men might be open to question, the above plan probably offers the only certain means of avoiding the danger of their participation in guerrilla action or sabotage in rear areas.

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